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Northern Ireland faces a number of acute challenges that threaten 
democratic accountability, accentuate border politics and emphasise the 
political fragility of the region. First, the risks of Brexit to Northern Ireland 
are unique and disproportionate to those for any other region or nation in 
the UK. Second, in addition to the profound challenges posed by leaving 
the European Union, local politics has exposed the frailty of political 
power-sharing in Northern Ireland. 
In analysis of these two divisive contexts, this article assesses the 
implications for the election contest held on 2 March 2017, and explores 
the ways in which Brexit offers distinctive considerations and challenges 
for the only part of the UK sharing a land border with the EU-27. These 
include consequences of the border, economic implications, citizenship 
rights, the impact on political stability and the peace process.
At this point everything is both possible and impossible. The prospect of 
maintaining a ‘frictionless and seamless’ border, in Theresa May’s words, 
appears out of reach and unrealistic. The British prime minister’s earlier 
commitment to a Brexit that would have no impact on the border in Ireland 
is now adrift. Currently, there is a lack of leadership offering a way out 
of Northern Ireland’s current political impasse and driving negotiation 
objectives in relation to Brexit. Making up 3 per cent of the UK’s population 
and 2 per cent of its economic output, it is unlikely that Northern Ireland 
will naturally fall at the top of the government’s Brexit checklist. The unique 
nature of the challenges posed by leaving the EU requires political leaders 
to come together from across the spectrum and place Northern Ireland 
before the deeply embedded fault lines of nationalism or unionism. 
A voice for Northern Ireland in 
the Brexit negotiations?
As the UK exits its relationship with the European Union, Northern Ireland 
is particularly bereft. Analysis of contemporary discussions has shown 
that there is little scope for bespoke or distinct Brexit practices within the 
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UK; anything desired by Scotland or Northern Ireland may well be difficult 
to achieve. 
The joint ministerial council (JMC) is framed around relationships built on 
principles of mutual understanding, consensus and eration, yet the scope 
for Northern Ireland to exert any meaningful influence on proceedings is 
mitigated by a lack of political voice and a largely neutered role as mediated 
by the structure of the JMC. 
During the referendum campaign the Northern Ireland executive was split 
on the issue of EU membership. The Democratic Unionist party (DUP) 
was the only major party to back the Leave campaign, viewing Brexit as 
an opportunity to strengthen a different union between nations, the United 
Kingdom. While Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness, the then deputy first 
minister, argued that a majority vote to remain demonstrated the need 
for a border poll on a united Ireland. The parties within the executive, and 
therefore at the forefront of protecting Northern Ireland’s priorities, clearly 
had very different visions for where Brexit was leading the country. 
Unassured of a local, national and international identity, relationships with 
key partners and, importantly, economic interests, as well as lacking a 
coherent political voice, triggering article 50 creates significant pressures 
for Northern Ireland. These challenges revolve around the nature of the 
Irish–Northern Irish border, trade, movement of people and investment.  
Each day 35,000 people cross the 310-mile stretch of border between 
Northern Ireland and Ireland, and according to the British Irish Chamber 
of Commerce accounts for €60 billion a year in two-way trade and directly 
supports 400,000 jobs.1 Outside of the EU customs union, it is unclear 
how checks would be imposed to monitor the movement of goods 
across the border. In terms of movement of people, the common travel 
area arrangements between the UK and Irish governments pre-date both 
countries’ entry into Europe, dating back to the creation of the Free State in 
1922. However, continuation was legitimised through EU treaty provisions, 
and accession to the internal market meant that customs checks were 
removed. On the basis of the government’s current strategy to leave the 
internal market, it is unlikely this arrangement will go unchanged, and 
impact on cross-border co-operation and travel is inevitable. This does not 
necessarily require the implementation of a ‘hard border’, but it is likely to 
become more visible as an administrative burden. 
Beyond the implications for trade and the movement of people, the border 
is deeply symbolic. The Northern Irish peace process embraced a more 
porous concept of national borders and a more fluid notion of national 
identity and sovereignty. People born in Northern Ireland have the right to 
Irish, and by default EU, citizenship. For nationalists, integration across 
the island of Ireland within a framework of shared European membership 
appeased their minority status within Northern Ireland. When asked in 
2015, ‘should the UK leave the EU?’, those identifying as Irish were most 
1 House of Lords (2016) ‘Select Committee on the European Union Corrected oral evidence: Brexit: UK-
Irish Relations’, 18 October 2016. http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/
evidencedocument/european-union-committee/brexit-ukirish-relations/oral/42018.html-
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likely to disagree (55 per cent), with British identifiers being less than half 
that (26 per cent).2 Removing common EU membership therefore has the 
potential to destabilise the nationalist psyche.
The concerns around the border therefore go far beyond the practical 
implications of customs checks and passports. Yet the insularity of the 
debate within the UK ignores the fact that the issues affecting the social, 
cultural and political relationships in Northern Ireland, and the ‘frictionless 
and seamless’ border relationships with the Republic of Ireland, are 
things that the UK cannot simply decide upon – they are also things that 
the EU-27 must agree upon. 
The legacy of three decades of conflict has left Northern Ireland with 
higher levels of unemployment than the UK average and a swollen 
public sector. The nature of the economy therefore exacerbates Northern 
Ireland’s vulnerability to the risks of Brexit, particularly considering that 
currently Northern Ireland is the greatest recipient of EU funding than any 
other region or nation in the UK. In an open letter to Theresa May, the 
first minister and deputy first minister highlighted the importance of EU 
funding to Northern Ireland’s economy and the peace process. The letter 
acknowledged that from 1994, Northern Ireland benefited to the tune of 
€13 billion of funding from Europe, while during the six-year period 2014–
2020 it is expected to receive over €3.5 billion.3 Scepticism exists across 
the political spectrum about whether the UK exchequer will plug this gap.
For the Brexit campaign, membership of the European Union was 
something to escape; the bullet to be dodged. For Northern Ireland, 
however, the European Union was not the bullet to be dodged but 
rather the instrument by which to keep the bullet out of Northern Ireland. 
The European Union membership helped build a stronger economy 
for Northern Ireland, and in the context of EU membership stronger 
relationships between Britain and Ireland have been forged. Brexit, and 
the sudden and unpredictable demise of power-sharing, is therefore 
an unwelcome challenge to a nation historically plagued by uncertain, 
contested and dysfunctional governance. 
What next for Northern Ireland?  
After a rollercoaster year, the 2 March 2017 election offered a litmus test for 
contemporary engagement with politics; a test for democracy and stability.
In Northern Ireland, public participation in elections has been steadily 
dropping from a height of 71.9 per cent in 1998 down to 54.9 per cent 
in the most recent 2016 assembly elections. With only 10 months since 
the last time voters went to the polls, this election is unlikely to inspire a 
larger turnout. Mainstream political alienation is not unique to Northern 
Ireland. As elsewhere in Europe, voter turnout decreases year on year. 
Intensification of voter apathy in Northern Ireland presents a further 
2 Tonge J (2016) Northern Ireland General Election Survey, 2015, data collection, UK Data Service SN: 
7523, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-7523-1
3 Northern Ireland Executive Office (2016) ‘Letter to the PM from the FM’, 10 August 2016. 
https://www.executiveoffice-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/execoffice/Letter%20
to%20PM%20from%20FM%20%26%20dFM.pdf
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challenge ahead of the upcoming March 2017 elections – elections 
shrouded in the toxicity of claims of political corruption over the renewable 
heat incentive (RHI) scandal as well as increasingly fractious relationships 
between the longstanding parties of government.
The RHI scheme, which was intended to promote the consumption of 
energy from renewable sources, was set up in 2012 by Arlene Foster, at 
the time the minister for enterprise, trade and investment. The flaw in the 
design of RHI meant users could legitimately earn more cash the more fuel 
they burned, which resulted in the scheme hugely overspending. The cost 
to the Northern Ireland budget is set to be almost £500 million. Calls by 
deputy first minster Martin McGuinness for the first minister, Arlene Foster, 
to stand aside while the scheme was investigated were not answered, 
prompting his resignation and, due to the shared position of deputy/first 
minister, was the trigger for new elections. 
Considering Northern Ireland’s past, it is difficult to conceive that the 
assembly was interrupted due to a good old-fashioned political expenses 
scandal rather than the legacies of the conflict. Yet, the way in which the 
RHI (or ‘cash for ash’) scandal has played out has historical tensions at its 
very heart. In one sense, the alliance between fundamentally incompatible 
political positions on constitutional issues as well as interpersonal relations 
meant that the collapse of governance was inevitable, a matter of time 
even. When Arlene Foster took over as first minister, the co-existence 
and even mutual respect discernible between McGuinness and Paisley, 
and then McGuinness and Robinson, evaporated. Foster’s tenure was 
characterised by increasing hostility towards Sinn Féin and the goodwill 
soon ebbed. 
Might the ‘bread and butter’ issues win out?
In 2007, the year that devolution was restored, the hope for a break in the 
tribalism and conflict-related politics surfaced. Ten years later, how visible 
are the ‘bread and butter’ issues? Almost 20 years into the peace process, 
conflict-related issues retain currency and voters remain tribal at the 
polling stations, benefiting both the DUP and Sinn Féin. 
While across the board there is a decline in voter turnout, nationalist 
parties in particular continue to haemorrhage voters. In the 2016 elections, 
nationalist parties were out of step with their voters on the key issues that 
were not about conflict, tribalism or the border. Rather, the SDLP lost votes 
in 2016 due to its intransigence to adopt a more nuanced position on gender 
and reproductive rights. In 2017, Sinn Féin is actively canvassing on this 
issue, setting itself apart from conflict-related paradigms. Within the tribal 
binaries of unionism and nationalism, this positioning offers up an interesting 
voting choice. An additional dynamic is the growth in candidates for smaller 
parties who enjoyed breakthrough successes in the 2016 election. For 
example, People Before Profit has expanded its candidate list from three to 
seven, having won two seats in 2016. 
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A ‘new’ Northern Irish assembly?
The assembly elections in 2017 presented a further uncertainty: in 
2016, for the first time since devolution was restored, Northern Ireland 
introduced a legislative act to decrease the size of the assembly from 
108 seats to 90. Two-hundred and twenty-eight candidates contested 
the seats on offer across the 18 constituencies.
Northern Ireland has traditionally remained bottom of the league 
tables across the devolved institutions with regards to female 
political representation. Between 1998 and 2016, Northern Ireland 
has only managed to average 19 per cent female representation in 
comparison to 37 per cent and 44 per cent for Scotland and Wales 
respectively. A reduction in seats usually has negative implications 
for female representation. Research indicates that when women 
are selected to stand as candidates in Northern Ireland, they are 
more likely to win the seat than their male counterparts. The largest 
obstacle to increasing the number of women in the assembly is the 
parties selecting them as candidates in the first place.4 It is therefore 
a positive sign that in 2017 there were more female candidates to 
help mitigate the fall in seats.
Capitalising on the then impasse, the centre-ground moderates of the 
Social Democratic and Labour party (SDLP) and the Ulster Unionist 
party (UUP) appealed for a cross-community transfer of votes, citing 
the 2017 election as the first time that the electorate had a ‘real choice’. 
UUP leader Mike Nesbitt made a plea at his recent party conference 
that a vote for Mike was a vote for the SDLP leader, Colum Eastwood. 
Meanwhile, for the party leader of the SDLP, a vote for the DUP and 
Sinn Féin meant ‘you end up with Theresa’ – an assurance of direct 
rule, thus signifying the deep and problematic divisions between the 
former partners in government. 
Once the votes are counted, the power-sharing nature of the 
assembly requires parties in the executive to agree on a programme 
for government: a strategic document setting out the priorities for the 
assembly’s following term. An additional hurdle in resuscitating the 
assembly is that the nationalist parties, Sinn Féin and the SDLP, have 
said they would not accept current Northern Ireland secretary James 
Brokenshire as neutral facilitator of these talks. 
Where to from here?
It is not the first time that Northern Irish politics has been described 
as being at a crossroads. However, watching the challenges of Brexit 
unfold against a backdrop of snap elections has highlighted the 
continuing fragility of post-conflict politics in Northern Ireland. The 
RHI scandal questioned the competency of decision-making and 
accountability in Northern Ireland. The recent election provided the 
electorate with an opportunity to decide whether they genuinely felt 
4 Braniff M and Whiting SA (2015) ‘‘‘There’s Just No Point Having a Token Woman”: Gender and Representation 
in the Democratic Unionist Party in Post-Agreement Northern Ireland’, Parliamentary Affairs, 68(4).
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like they had a ‘real choice’ this time around, or whether intransigent 
traditional fault lines would result in the return of the DUP and Sinn 
Féin as the two largest parties.
Maire Braniff is the director of the International Conflict Research 
Institute at Ulster University, and Sophie Whiting is a lecturer in 
politics at the University of Bath.
